




# Introduction to PES and REDD+ Implications for participating land managers



Training Workshop on Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and  
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+)  
Nairobi, Kenya - August 8<sup>th</sup>, 2011

SARA NAMIREMBE  
WORLD AGROFORESTRY CENTER

# Payments for Ecosystems services



Provision of incentives or rewards to land managers for implementing practices that conserve or enhance a clearly defined natural or ecological benefit(s).

- Accesses markets and new financing for conservation


- Not a win-win solution - hard trade-offs

- Voluntary

- Conditional – *Buyer makes direct payments based on performance*


## REDD - Reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 'plus'

REDD-plus seeks to reward governments, companies or forest owners in developing nations for keeping tropical forests instead of cutting them down



**Sink:**  
Absorb  
 $\approx 2.6 \text{ GtC/y}$

**Reservoirs:** forests store about 638 GtC




**Source:**  
Deforestation emits  
 $\approx 1.6 \text{ GtC/y} \equiv 17\%$   
of anthropogenic  
GHG



# Some key concepts

**Baseline** – A reference scenario predicting what the situation would be without project intervention



**Additionality** – Proving that ES from project implementation are improved over and above the baseline scenario

**Leakage** – Risk of ecosystem destruction resulting from project implementation

**Permanence** – Emission reductions from project implementation are sustained for 'long enough'

# Conditions for PES



Profitability of PES exists compared to existing landuses

The beneficiaries have the capacity and are willing to pay for these actions

A defined group of people is willing to undertake these actions – sellers.

Certain actions can be taken to conserve, restore or enhance that environmental service

The service is of great importance to a well defined group of people - beneficiaries

Access to a clearly defined environmental service is not optimum, or is under threat or declining – baseline



# Actors

## WHO GETS PAID?



- Communities
- Governments
- Industry
- Large-scale investors

## WHO PAYS?

- Companies: Airlines, courier; Coca cola; breweries; Mining; Water bottling; Irrigation
- Banks: World Bank – Ug, Tz
- Governments: Norway, US, South Africa, Zambia
- Events: CHOGM; World cup
- Celebrities in music and film

## WHO FACILITATES?

- Regulators
- Brokers
- Project developers
- Researchers



# Mechanisms of payment

| Conventional  | Alternative   |
|---|---|
| Periodic - contingent on monitored service provision  | Up-front - made in good faith   |
| Cash- if foregone actions were meant to generate cash | Non-financial benefits such as capacity building and improved access to market                |
| Group contracts                                       | Individual contracts  |
| Targeting single clearly defined ES                   | Bundled payments – not all ES may be scarce and not all beneficiaries would be willing to pay |

# PES schemes

- *Public schemes*: the state acts on behalf of ES buyers by collecting taxes and grants and pays ES providers.
- *Private schemes* are more locally focused and buyers pay providers directly
- *Use-restricting schemes* rewards for capping resource extraction and land development; or for fully setting aside protected areas
- *Asset-building schemes*: Aimed at restoring or building ES from bare or degraded landscape.





# Challenges for PES

- **Conditionality** or contingent periodic payments :
  - Difficult to achieve
  - Requires that funding is sustained
  - Regular monitoring is expensive
- **Demand** for ES is low
- PES **costs** are high for project start-up and running
- Risk of **crowding out** culturally rooted conservation values.
- PES **may decouple conservation from development**
- **Uneven power relations** - providers can only be paid what beneficiaries give; Risk of elite capture
- PES may discriminate against those with weak tenure rights – **biased towards better off**
- **New institutional linkages** may be needed
- **New skills** required: land-use and service monitoring, facilitating negotiation, and financial intermediation; trust-building
- PES mechanisms are context-dependent – **scaling up** may be challenging



# Conclusions

- PES has the added advantage of enhancing efficiency in natural resource conservation
- It enables accessing of new finances for natural resource management
- It is additional to other NR approaches
- Expectations from PES should be realistic: Primarily to deliver on ES and not be burdened with development agendas
- Potential service buyers should understand and be confident about PES in order to create the necessary demand
- A range of PES mechanisms should be considered to determine what fits the context

# Thank You

For more information, contact

Sara Namirembe  
[s.namirembe@cgiar.org](mailto:s.namirembe@cgiar.org)



World Agroforestry Centre  
<http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org>